The Trump administration argues that proceeds from Iran’s shadow fleet are funneled to the government’s security apparatus, weapons programs and regional proxy groups, enabling further repression of anti-regime activities. This comes as the White House faces criticism of its own for aggressive immigration enforcement operations across the U.S. and the use of heavy-handed tactics leading to the deaths of two protesters in Minnesota this month.

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said the measures aim at cutting off “a critical component” of Iran’s revenue generation. He vowed to keep tracking funds going towards Iran’s illicit activities.

The sanctions designations, made through Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, were issued under Executive Order 13902, a directive from Trump’s first term which authorizes sanctions on Iran’s petroleum and petrochemical sectors.

Among the shadow fleet vessels facing new sanctions are the Sea Bird, managed by UAE-based Horizon Harvest Shipping LLC; the Avon, tied to India-based Aayat Ship Management Private Limited; and the Al Diab II, linked to Oman-based Black Stone Oil and Gas. Treasury also named the Cesaria, Longevity 7, Eastern Hero, Aqua Spirit, and two Comoros-flagged ships—Chiron 5 and Keel—as part of the transport network.

The step by OFAC freezes any U.S.-linked assets to the vessels and bars Americans from doing business with them.

The Houthis, whose soldiers are based in Yemen and backed by Iran, have been engaged in a brutal civil war against the Saudi-backed Yemeni government since 2014. The Houthis are accused of committing widespread human rights abuses, as is Yemen’s government.

In this most recent action, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned 21 people and companies– as well as one vessel– targeting what it called financial channels linking the Iranian government to the Houthis, formally known as Ansarallah. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said the move aims to “cut off” nearly two dozen actors involved in transferring oil, procuring weapons and providing financial services for the group in Yemen.

The action was taken under Executive Order 13224, a Bush-era directive allowing the White House to impose sanctions on perceived terrorist actors. The State Department labelled the Houthis a Specially Designated Global Terrorist group in February 2024. A year later, the White House deepened the sanctions, designating the group a Foreign Terrorist Organization, which comes with more restrictions and legal ramifications for those who materially support them.

U.S. officials said the Houthis continue to generate substantial revenue through illicit oil activity—estimated at more than $2 billion a year—despite international sanctions. The Treasury Department accused Iran of supplying oil to the group, including through companies based in Dubai, and said UAE-based facilitators helped process payments via exchanges operating in Yemen and the Emirates.

Among the targets in this most recent round of sanctions were firms and individuals accused of supporting Houthi fuel imports and logistics, including a Sana’a, Yemen-linked trading company that OFAC said shipped communications gear, industrial materials and other equipment into Houthi-controlled areas. The Treasury Department also sanctioned an exchange house it said was used to finance weapons purchases and route payments for smuggling operations across the Red Sea region.

OFAC officials also accused Houthi-aligned operatives of trying to establish two Sana’a-based airlines to support smuggling and illicit revenue generation, including attempted aircraft procurement involving convicted arms dealer Viktor Bout.

Meanwhile, in Venezuela, the U.S. is beginning to carry out President Trump’s desire to “run the country” until a transition in power can be made.

Though the news broke rather suddenly and unexpectedly, the U.S. Department of the Treasury left a paper trail of Venezuela-related sanctions in the weeks leading up to Maduro’s capture, highlighting the Trump administration’s desire to connect Venezuelan oil to narco trafficking and the ruling government in Caracas.

The U.S. turned up the heat sanctions-wise in November, when the federal government designated the drug-smuggling Cartel de los Soles as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) run by Maduro and other high-ranking officials from within the Venezuelan government.

This essentially put Maduro in the same league as al-Qaeda or the Islamic State, perhaps an attempt by the Trump administration to build the case to the American public that military intervention against the Caribbean nation may well be warranted. Trump, in his address on Saturday, called out the Cartel de los Soles by name.

After this terrorism designation, the Treasury Department on December 3 slapped new sanctions on those involved with money laundering for the fearsome Venezuelan-based drug cartel Tren de Aragua. In his announcement that several new affiliates with the group would be barred from accessing the U.S. financial system, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said that “barbaric terrorist cartels can no longer operate with impunity across our borders.”

Then, just over a week later, the Trump administration tied together the three T’s—terrorism, trafficking, and (oil) tankers. On December 11, the Office of Foreign Assets Control issued sanctions against the family members of Maduro’s wife, Cilia Flores. They were accused of helping to prop up Venezuela’s sanctioned oil industry as well as Maduro’s “narco-terrorist regime.”

This move coincided with efforts by the U.S. to intercept Venezuelan oil tankers believed to be transporting banned petroleum to global ports.

Sanctions, beyond their mechanical purpose of freezing finances, also serve a deeply symbolic role. They give governments the ability to name their enemy and explain their enemy’s wrongdoing prior to putting boots on the ground.

Given this, it is no surprise that following the sanctions against Venezuelan First Lady Cilia Flores’ family, the Treasury Department sanctioned more Maduro family members before turning its attention to Venezuela’s military capabilities and close ties to America’s greatest state adversary in the Middle East, Iran.

Just before the new year, the Trump administration announced it would be financially isolating—through sanctions— the company Empresa Aeronáutica Nacional. The firm is known for making extensive purchases of military drones from Iran.

The Treasury Department shared the photo below of a partially assembled Iranian surveillance drone—the Mohajer-2 UAV—at the Libertador Air Base in Maracay, Venezuela.

Finally, before the attack and capture of Maduro came a fresh round of sanctions on those tied to Venezuela’s state-run oil company, whom Trump is now likely seeking to dismantle.

THE BIG QUESTION

If the plan was always to topple Maduro and his government by force, using as justification a federal criminal indictment, why engage in such aggressive sanctions beforehand?

After all, in the trifecta of criminal justice, military force, and economic sanctions, the latter is probably viewed as the least effective tool at changing behavior.

The most obvious answer may be that sanctions simply set the stage to justify military action. The Trump administration is building a case, presenting Venezuela as an unstable narco-state fueled by illicit oil and military connections to America’s enemies.

Another reason for the sanctions campaign may be deception. Seeing the already stiff financial walls the U.S. has built around Venezuela grow higher may have placated Caracas into thinking their fate would be like Cuba’s—a stiff embargo but no boots meaningfully on the ground.

Sanctions are the tool you use when you don’t want to spill blood and make things messy. Though they can result in real economic damage, they are a milder middle ground.

This argument, though, could be undermined by the very public saber-rattling from the Trump administration in the later months of 2025. The world knew American warships were in the Caribbean and that war or land strikes could come at any time.

Maybe, in the end, the recent sanctions campaign was meant to serve its most basic purpose: to drain Maduro, his wife, and their associates of any financial resources before going in for the symbolic kill.

This comes as the U.S. government attempts to physically block the tankers from leaving Venezuela, having seized two vessels off the Caribbean nation’s northern coast in recent weeks.

The latest sanctions, announced by the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control on Wednesday, underscores Washington’s focus on disrupting what it describes as a growing “shadow fleet” of tankers used to move Venezuelan crude oil outside formal markets and evade existing sanctions to profit. Oil is the linchpin of the country’s economy, making up almost all of its export revenue.

Officials in the Trump administration argue this oil trade provides critical financial support to the Maduro regime, which the U.S. government deems illegitimate and closely tied to narcotics trafficking.

The newly sanctioned oil firms accused of operating in Venezuela — Aries Global Investment, Corniola Limited, Krape Myrtle, and Winky International Limited — will face asset freezes and won’t be able to conduct business with Americans. The Treasury Department’s move also effectively cuts off the firms’ tankers from the U.S. financial system and complicates their ability to operate internationally.

The move builds on earlier actions against Venezuela’s state-run oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A., which was sanctioned in 2019, as well as more recent penalties imposed last month on PDVSA-linked officials, companies and vessels.

U.S. officials say the latest designations are meant to send a clear signal to traders, shipowners and financiers that involvement in Venezuela’s oil trade carries mounting legal and financial risk.

“President Trump has been clear: We will not allow the illegitimate Maduro regime to profit from exporting oil while it floods the United States with deadly drugs,” said Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent. “The Treasury Department will continue to implement President Trump’s campaign of pressure on Maduro’s regime.”

Specifically, the federal government is excluding from the American financial system family members of Maduro’s wife, Cilia Flores.

This new round of sanctions will hit Flores’ nephew’s family. In addition, the Trump administration is seeking to economically isolate the family members of Ramon Carretero, a businessman from Panama who U.S. officials accuse of conducting extensive business with the Venezuelan government and the Flores family.

In announcing the sanctions Friday, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent sought to tie the Maduro regime to drug smuggling.

“Today, Treasury sanctioned individuals who are propping up Nicolás Maduro’s rogue narco-state,” Bessent said. “We will not allow Venezuela to continue flooding our nation with deadly drugs.”

This move comes as the Trump administration ramps up its campaign to tie the Venezuelan government to drug cartels and narcotics trafficking.

As we previously reported, in November the Trump administration designated the Cartel de los Soles as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) headed by Maduro himself.

Then, in a phone interview with NBC News this week, President Trump refused to rule out war with Venezuela after he ordered a blockade of sanctioned oil tankers travelling to and from the South American nation.

In light of these events, Friday’s sanctions, while unlikely to be covered widely by American media, show the White House’s continued effort to confront the Venezuelan government.

The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is seeking to financially isolate the Cartel de Santa Rosa de Lima, or CSRL, an organization based in the country’s Guanajuato state whose core business is stealing fuel and crude oil from Mexico’s state energy company, Petróleos Mexicanos, or Pemex.

According to U.S. officials, fuel theft has become one of the most significant non-drug sources of revenue for Mexican cartels.

Oil is often stolen by bribing or threatening Pemex employees, U.S. officials say. Criminal networks also tap pipelines, hijack tanker trucks and siphon fuel from refineries. Stolen gasoline and diesel are sold across Mexico and into Central America, while crude oil is typically smuggled north into the United States.

In addition to the sanctions against the cartel itself, Treasury also designated CSRL’s leader, José Antonio Yépez Ortiz, known as “El Marro,” subjecting him to targeted financial restrictions.

The fight for control of pipelines and refineries in Guanajuato has helped turn the state into one of Mexico’s most dangerous. Much of the violence stems from clashes between CSRL and the far larger Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación, or CJNG. Beyond the bloodshed, Treasury argues the cartel’s activities fuel a cross-border energy black market that deprives Mexico of tax revenue and undercuts legitimate U.S. oil and gas companies.

According to U.S. officials, crude shipments are often mislabeled as waste oil or other hazardous materials to evade scrutiny. Once across the border, complicit brokers and importers sell the oil at steep discounts on U.S. and global markets, funneling the proceeds back to criminal groups in Mexico.

Mexican authorities have reported billions of dollars in losses at Pemex in recent years linked to fuel theft.

The move builds on earlier steps by the U.S. to target fuel-theft networks. In February, the State Department formally labeled CJNG a foreign terrorist organization. In May, Treasury sanctioned individuals and companies tied to a CJNG-linked fuel-smuggling ring, while the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network warned U.S. banks of red flags associated with crude-oil laundering schemes.

In the months following that alert, banks flagged hundreds of millions of dollars in suspicious transactions tied to oil smuggling, many routed through Texas border cities and Florida.

According to U.S. officials, the network recruits ex-Colombian soldiers and sends them to fight for Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a paramilitary group accused of widespread atrocities in the African country. The conflict in Sudan began in 2023 and has become one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises. Treasury officials say the paramilitary network has drawn hundreds of experienced fighters from Colombia, and has also funneled money to help train soldiers inside Sudan, including children.

The move on Tuesday aims to cut off those involved with this operation from accessing the American financial system. Assets belonging to the sanctioned people and entities that touch U.S. banks will be frozen.

Since the war began in Sudan, the RSF group and its allies have been accused of systematically killing civilians, carrying out mass sexual violence, and blocking access to humanitarian aid. The violence has been especially severe in Darfur.

In an announcement on Tuesday, U.S. officials also said RSF forces, supported by foreign fighters like the ex-Colombian soldiers, captured El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur. Following the capture, the group carried out mass killings, ethnically targeted torture, and sexual violence. In January 2025, the U.S. State Department determined that members of the RSF committed genocide.

U.S. authorities say the Colombian fighters involved in this campaign of terror have reportedly served as infantry, artillery operators, drone pilots, vehicle operators, and instructors, and took part in battles in Khartoum, Omdurman, Kordofan, and El Fasher.

Officials said the recruitment effort was coordinated by a retired Colombian military officer operating through a network of companies and associates that specializes in hiring fighters and moving money. A Colombia-based employment agency was allegedly used to attract soldiers, while a Panama-based staffing firm is said to have helped sign contracts and receive funds, obscuring the connection between the recruiters and the group operating in Sudan.

The move comes amid mounting scrutiny of the Trump administration over its military strikes against alleged drug smuggling boats north of Venezuela.

Chief among those now cut off from the American financial system by the recent sanctions is Jimena Romina Araya Navarro, a Venezuelan entertainer known professionally as “Rosita.” She is accused of providing material support to Tren de Aragua’s leadership and organizing drug-fueled raves to support the cartel, according to Treasury officials. She also allegedly helped Niño Guerrero, her supposed boyfriend and the leader of the organization, escape from prison in Venezuela.

Beyond her alleged involvement in one of Latin America’s most feared criminal organizations, Rosita has amassed millions of followers on social media as an influencer and often performs at nightclubs in Colombia, according to new information released by the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).

In recent months, the Trump administration has turned up the heat on both the Venezuelan government and drug cartels operating in the country, seeking to connect the two. In November, the White House designated Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro as leader of the narcoterrorist group Cartel de los Soles.

This comes in addition to aggressive American military action in the Caribbean, which has included at least 21 strikes on alleged drug boats in the region and in the Pacific, according to The Hill. At least 83 people have died as a result.

Beyond Rosita, the U.S. government also sanctioned Eryk Manuel Landaeta Hernandez, identified as a financial and logistics coordinator for Tren de Aragua in Bogotá prior to his arrest by Colombian authorities in 2024. American officials said Landaeta organized events and nightlife operations that were used to sell drugs, with proceeds laundered back to Tren de Aragua leaders.

In addition to the entertainment-linked network, OFAC sanctioned several alleged senior figures within the organization. They include a man known as “El Flipper,” whom Treasury identified as a top lieutenant to Niño Guerrero and a key financial operator before his arrest in Colombia late last month. Authorities also sanctioned a Colombian company, Yakera y Lane SAS, which they say was controlled by Sevilla Arteaga and used in illegal drug operations.

IPI Partners, which invests in and operates data centers, will hand over $11.49 million for allegedly receiving investments linked to sanctioned Russian billionaire Suleiman Kerimov.

Kerimov maintains close ties with Russian President Vladimir Putin and was formerly associated with brutal Moscow-backed Chechen warlord Ramzan Kadyrov. The two have since had a falling out, according to The Moscow Times.

For his relationship with the Kremlin, the U.S. government slapped sanctions on Kerimov in April 2018 under an Obama-era program designed to economically punish Russia for its initial invasion of Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula in 2014. This action barred American companies from conducting business with Kerimov, either directly or indirectly.

However, according to federal regulators, IPI arranged and accepted $50 million in investments during 2017 and 2018 from Definition, a British Virgin Islands-based entity connected to the Kerimov family. Officials say IPI continued this financial relationship with the company several years after Kerimov’s designation on the sanctions list. IPI also allegedly sought outside legal advice to manage the situation.

In announcing the federal government’s settlement with IPI, regulators with the Treasury Department said the American company’s violations were not “egregious.” In assessing the penalty, officials cited mitigating factors such as IPI’s lack of prior sanctions violations, alongside aggravating factors including the firm’s prior knowledge that Kerimov was the original source of the funds and its continued involvement after sanctions were imposed.

U.S. officials also underscored the compliance risks faced by private equity firms when dealing with complex ownership structures that may obscure sanctioned individuals’ interests.

Demetrios Serghides is believed to have managed the money of Alisher Usmanov, a billionaire whose wealth stems from his partial ownership of the Moscow-based mining and steel company Metalloinvest.

The U.S. first cut off Serghides from the American banking system in 2023, when the Department of the Treasury — alongside its counterpart in the United Kingdom — announced new sanctions against 25 of Usmanov’s closest allies and business partners.

While the Biden administration loudly announced those sanctions, the recent removal of Serghides from the sanctions list on November 26 came with no official explanation from the White House.

But this financier’s background and the timing of the sanctions removals may be illuminating.
In addition to freeing up the financial blockade against Serghides, Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) also granted relief to a handful of powerful Cyprus-based organizations and individuals tied to Serghides.

This all might be the earliest signs of the Trump administration pushing for an agreement to end the Turkish occupation of Cyprus in order to open up energy opportunities in the Eastern Mediterranean. Stick with me.

THE BACKGROUND

Cyprus is an island nation tucked in the Mediterranean Sea just south of Turkey and west of Syria.

The British ruled there until independence in 1960. Soon after, the island launched into a downward spiral fueled by ethnic tension.

The population of Cyprus is split between a Greek majority and a Turkish minority. For decades, both parent countries— bitter rivals as they are— tried to steer the island into each of their orbits.

In 1974, Greek forces attempted a coup. Turkey then invaded soon after, taking control of a third of the island which it still controls today.

The result is a split nation. The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is dug in to the north and the Greek-speaking Republic of Cyprus governs the south. The capital city of Nicosia is cut in half by the UN-administered green zone.

On paper, the United States and its allies in Europe only recognize the Republic of Cyprus, considering the Turkish breakaway state to be illegitimate. Sectarian violence on the island is rare, but a permanent solution to de facto division remains out of reach.

WHAT’S NEXT

It would be irresponsible to say the United States lifting sanctions on several Cypriot nationals and organizations is a sure sign of the Trump administration’s increased involvement in the island.

But could it fit into a pattern?

There is at least some interest in Washington in getting the Turks out of Cyprus. Just before President Trump’s second inauguration in January, a bipartisan group of four Greek-Americans in the U.S. House of Representatives introduced a resolution urging Trump to solve “the Cyprus problem,” calling it “a top foreign policy priority.”

Then, in October, Trump nominated a new ambassador to the island, John Breslow. Cypriot media is picking up on something as well. Politis, one of the central Greek-language newspapers in Cyprus, published an article in November predicting a forthcoming U.S. proposal to remove the Turkish military from Cyprus as part of a larger move to access energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The interest in changing the political landscape of Cyprus is likely not rooted in a moral cause, but rather in practical American energy objectives.

With new sanctions on Russian oil and the general desire to get Europe off of Moscow’s energy, the Trump administration has championed a number of natural gas projects in the eastern Mediterranean. One, the Vertical Gas Corridor, provides a route for transporting liquefied natural gas from Greece to eastern Europe, bypassing Russian sources.

In a brief published this August, the United States Energy Association presented the corridor as “a viable alternative to Russian gas.”

In November, the energy ministers of Cyprus, Greece, and Israel met with U.S. government officials in Athens. Following the talks, they released a joint statement in support of “broader regional interconnectivity projects, currently in progress and future ones.”

This all comes years after the first Trump administration pushed for an even larger Eastern Mediterranean Gas pipeline, which would harness new LNG discoveries in Cyprus. In fact, construction on the island’s first piece of LNG infrastructure began this year (see below).

However, Turkey is getting in the way. A report from the U.S. Energy Information Administration in September noted that territorial disputes between Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus have created difficulties for the prospect of bringing the Eastern Mediterranean Gas pipeline to life.

Perhaps freeing up the entire island from Turkish influence could accomplish American energy goals in the region and lessen dependence on Russian energy in the long term.

The formerly-sanctioned Serghides could prove a link between Cyprus and Russia that could aide the U.S. in diplomatic efforts on the island.

Whether this is the reason the Department of the Treasury decided to remove sanctions on him and his associates remains to be seen.

For now, one thing is certain: watch for U.S. moves in Cyprus.

The Trump administration announced plans Monday to designate Venezuela’s Cartel de los Soles as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) headed by Venezuela’s leader Nicolás Maduro. The action comes after the Treasury Department labelled the group a Specially Designated Global Terrorist — a step below FTO— this summer.

The White House accuses the Cartel de los Soles of embedding itself in Venezuela’s security and political institutions while working alongside other criminal organizations such as Tren de Aragua and Mexico’s Sinaloa Cartel to traffic drugs into the United States.

The move marks a leap in escalation between the United States and Venezuela’s ruling regime, perhaps providing further justification should American forces take military action against Caracas.

Tensions between the two countries have risen substantially over the past months, as the Trump administration ramped up strikes against alleged drug traffickers operating off of Venezuela’s northern coast. Monday’s terrorism designation essentially makes the entire Venezuelan government a drug cartel in the eyes of the U.S., allowing Washington to cut the country off from any ties it has to the American financial system.

Classifying Maduro and his allies as narco-terrorists is neither unexpected nor unprecedented. In 2020, the Department of Justice indicted Maduro on federal narco-trafficking and money laundering charges.
What is striking about the latest attempt to isolate the Venezuelan regime is the timing, coming as American military presence ramps up in the region, fueling the prospect of armed conflict.

But the U.S. government can’t seem to meaningfully touch the widespread sale of Iranian petroleum, which enters ports around the world undetected.

This week, the Department of the Treasury slapped new economic sanctions on several organizations, ships, and shell companies thought to be involved in the sale of Iranian oil through the use of a ghost fleet operating in the darkest corners of the globe, out of the reach of government enforcement.

WHAT IS THE GHOST FLEET AND HOW DOES IT OPERATE?

To fund its military and foreign policy operations, Iran runs an oil company called Sepehr Energy Jahan, according to records from the federal government.

The U.S. government—to blunt Sepehr’s profits— has laid stiff and complex sanctions against Iranian petroleum industry – whose sales Washington believes fund terrorism.

The sanctions try to exile every dollar tied to the oil from the American financial system—all in hopes of deterring global buyers.

But the world is big and profiteers are cunning.

The Iranian government has developed a sophisticated system of evading sanctions by obscuring the origin of its oil.

This is done through the use of a ghost fleet — a cadre of older oil tankers carrying the flags of third-party countries like Guyana, Gambia, or Panama. They load oil from Iran and set sail for remote stretches of sea.

When the ships arrive in these areas, they often offload the Iranian oil onto other tankers bound for ports in China. The labels of the oil are often changed– crude from Iran may have a sticker saying it’s coming from Malaysia. Sometimes the ships carry duplicate logs claiming the oil onboard is from a non-sanctioned source. The goal is to create a fugue of deception that outwits American authorities who point and shoot at any oil known to be Iranian. Below is a ship-to-ship rendezvous of members of the ghost fleet. The waters near Malaysia are particularly popular for this maneuver.

Many times, the ships of the ghost fleet will also turn off their mandatory tracking devices or change their location – a practice known as spoofing.

Beyond this, the ships will change their country of origin and even repaint their hull to evade detection once U.S. authorities catch on, according to reporting from Reuters.

The result is a cat-and-mouse game where the U.S. Department of the Treasury tries to slap sanctions on the companies and ships it believes are carrying Iranian crude, only to have new tankers and companies pop up to continue the illicit work.

According to the organization United Against a Nuclear Iran, the value of Iranian oil transported by the ghost fleet topped $10 billion between June and August of 2025.

The companies hit in the latest round of U.S. sanctions this week include Luan Bird Shipping Service L.L.C and UAE-based Mars Investment L.L.C.

The Trump administration presented this move as an effort to tighten the economic punishment on Iran’s petroleum industry.

“Today’s action continues Treasury’s campaign to cut off funding for the Iranian regime’s development of nuclear weapons and support of terrorist proxies,” Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said Thursday.

The fact remains, however, that the ghost fleet continues moving Iranian oil en masse to ports around the globe. Finding a way to disrupt that in a meaningful way remains a challenge.

On Wednesday, the United States, along with the United Kingdom and Australia, issued a new round of sanctions against two online criminal enterprises and their leaders.

Because of this move, those affiliated with the groups will not be able to send or receive money with Americans and will see any assets in the U.S. – or even traveling through the U.S. – seized.

The first target of Wednesday’s sanctions is the innocuous-sounding Media Land LLC. Based in St. Petersburg, the U.S. Department of the Treasury accuses them of providing so-called bulletproof hosting services that provide a launchpad for ransomware operations.

Put another way, bulletproof hosting is essentially computer infrastructure that welcomes its use by cybercriminals and evades government efforts to shut it down.

Media Land advertised its hosting capabilities on cybercriminal forums, U.S. officials say. Below are the pictures of Media Land leaders Aleksandr Volosovik, Yulia Pankova, and Kirill Zatolokin, who is seen with a gun. Zatolokin is also wearing a shirt that says “Media Land” in Russian Cyrillic letters.

In addition to Media Land, the multinational government coalition is also slapping new sanctions on Hypercore Ltd., a company believed to be a rebrand of the notorious Aeza Group (previously sanctioned), which is accused of facilitating large-scale cybercrime.

The challenge in these new sanctions – and others against alleged cybercriminals – is whether they will amount to anything more than a symbolic punishment. Cybercriminals are often incredibly effective at evading sanctions through tactful virtual strategies. This includes the use of cryptocurrency to shelter or hide assets that would otherwise be easily blocked and frozen by American banks and other financial institutions.

In fact, a 2024 report from the Government Accountability Office found that Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies “pose risks to implementing and enforcing U.S. sanctions.”

However, the report also notes that transactions in cryptocurrencies are all on a public ledger, accessible to anyone looking for the illegal transfer of money. This begs the question: are government agencies putting enough resources forward to make sure sanctions stick?

But Washington is already softening the impact of its own decision. Days after the U.S. granted Hungary a one-year exemption from the sanctions, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control is now allowing certain oil customers to conduct limited business — sanction-free — with Lukoil and Rosneft through December 13 at midnight.

Under the new waivers (seen below), buying and selling oil with the two companies will be temporarily permitted on several oil projects in Kazakhstan, including a pipeline along the Caspian Sea. Without these waivers, the U.S. would attempt to freeze any transactions it could that are related to the Russian firms starting in just days.

As part of this temporary easing, the U.S. government is also exempting Lukoil’s business in Bulgaria from sanctions until April 2026.

This comes as several major news outlets report that Lukoil is looking to sell off its foreign assets, which would allow its core business in Europe to continue operating, albeit it out of Russian hands. Proceeds from any sale would likely be placed in an account inaccessible until the sanctions are lifted, according to Politico.

The move by the Trump administration could be seen as an effort to facilitate the orderly sale of Lukoil and Rosneft’s foreign assets, allowing more time for any deal to close.

Any business with the two companies not covered under the latest waivers will be subject to sanctions — meaning U.S. banks will freeze whatever money they can related to the firms — beginning on November 21.

Those targeted by the new actions include Antifa-Ost of Germany, Armed Proletarian Justice and Revolutionary Class Self-Defense of Greece, and the Informal Anarchist Federation of Italy.

This move by the U.S. comes in the wake of escalating rhetoric by the White House against far-left groups within the United States. In September, President Trump declared American Antifa chapters (short for anti-fascist) a domestic terrorist organization.

The new sanctions against the European groups seek to freeze the financial assets of the organizations and economically isolate them. Americans also risk sanctions themselves for doing business with them.

In a statement Thursday, a spokesperson with the U.S. Department of State outlined the violent history associated with the four groups in particular.

Members of Antifa-Ost, U.S. officials and German prosecutors say, were responsible for attacks on a gathering of right-wing extremists in Budapest in 2023.

Greece’s Armed Proletarian Justice admitted to placing a bomb near the headquarters of the Greek riot police in the Athens suburb of Goudi in 2023, according to Greek news outlets and the State Department. The bomb apparently did not detonate because of a failure in wiring.

The Greek anarchist faction Revolutionary Class Self-Defense is linked with an IED blast at the offices of Greece’s railway; no injuries were reported in that instance, though the building was significantly damaged. The group also targeted the country’s labor ministry headquarters with explosives.

These groups are now sanctioned under a program that puts them in company with al-Qaeda, the New Irish Republican Army, Boko Haram of Nigeria, and the Communist Party of the Philippines, among many other organizations.

The chief target of the new sanctions is the Albanian-linked Hysa Organized Crime Group. Its leader, Luftar Hysa, is accused of laundering cash for narco traffickers through several casinos and high-end restaurants he owns in Mexico. U.S. officials believe Hysa acts in collaboration with the Sinaloa Cartel.

The move by the U.S. to cut off the Hysa group’s financial assets comes one day after the Mexican government shut down 13 casinos in the country suspected of laundering money.

Beyond casinos, members of the Hysa group are also alleged to be working with a “U.S. person’s company” to smuggle large amounts of cash from Mexico into the United States.

In addition to the sanctions, carried out by the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. officials said the federal government’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network is also seeking to exclude 10 Mexican casinos from accessing the U.S. financial system.

“Our message to those supporting the cartels is clear: They will be held accountable,” said Treasury Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence John K. Hurley.

The suspected link between the Hysa family and cartels in Mexico has been a long time coming. In 2023, well-known Mexican newspaper El Universal reported that Mexican intelligence authorities believed the Albanian business family was linked to notorious Sinaloa Cartel leader Ismael Zambada, known as “El Mayo,” who was arrested and arraigned in a federal court in Brooklyn in 2024.

The Hysa family, however, denied any links with El Mayo.

What is certain, however, is the close ties between the Hysa group and Albania, which is still listed as each sanctioned member’s nationality. The Office of Foreign Assets Control omitted this fact in its initial public-facing sanctions designation announcement.

Relations between the Trump administration and Albania’s ruling socialist party are perhaps lukewarm. Recent reporting from the New York Times revealed Albania’s conservative opposition Democratic Party paid more than $1.6 million to Trump aides for assistance in a national election in May. The party ultimately lost, despite the hands-on help of U.S. Republican strategist Chris LaCivita.

It is not clear whether the relations between the U.S. and Albania played a role in how the sanctions against the Hysa group were portrayed to the public today. For now, the more than two dozen individuals and entities tied to this alleged money laundering racket are facing financial isolation from American banks and customers. The challenge for the U.S.—as with most of its economic sanctions—is preventing those they target from finding a workaround.